In August 9th Belarus held an election, where President Lukashenka secured another term in office. According to official statistics, he received some 80% of the votes. The runner up, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, allegedly got just 10%. There is nothing new or surprising about the results of the elections – Lukashenka has managed to stay in power for over 20 years with the use of electoral fraud and political repression. What is novel, however, is the popular response of Belarusians. The political opposition has been able to organize widespread anti-government protests and rallies, the largest of which have involved hundreds of thousands of people. An impressive feat from a population that many consider politically apathetic as a heritage from decades of authoritarian rule.
A noteworthy aspect about the situation is the prominent role of women. Tsikhanouskaya was the only oppositional presidential candidate allowed to register and since then she has become a symbol of democracy for the political opposition. Although there is no reliable statistic available, her vote count is very likely to be much higher than the official rating. She’s not the only Belarusian woman actively opposing the regime, though. Weekly women’s marches have become an important form of protesting. The bold action taken by women has been noted even by the European Parliament[1].
Despite popular anti-government sentiment, various demonstrations, strikes and (mostly moral) support from abroad, the political opposition in Belarus is facing tough odds. Compared to the optimistic mood of early August, lately the number of people taking part in public protesting is decreasing. Strikes in the state-owned factories – perhaps the most effective way to pressure the government – have been all but thwarted through coercion. Lukashenka still seems to hold the loyalty of the security forces, whose methods to disperse demonstrations has grown increasingly violent during the recent weeks.
However, something in the political situation has changed fundamentally and, it seems, irrevocable despite the effective governmental repression. “The genie is out of the bottle”, as Judy Dempsey, an expert at Carnegie Europe, wrote after the election[2]. Even though the current situations warrant less optimism than the weeks following the election, prospects for political change in Belarus haven’t been this good in decades. Protests in the street may die out, but Lukashenka will have to struggle to restore his legitimacy as leader of the nation.
What Russia’s got to do with it?
Dictators tend to stick together. The reasons are political considerations and, just as importantly, fear. It is telling that after the election Lukashenka received congratulations mostly from authoritarian leaders. Perhaps the person most vested in Belarus is President Putin. The reason for his interest in Belarusian affairs is two-fold:
Firstly, Belarus and Russia have a close relationship. The nations share not only a cultural and historical bond, but also several state level treaties aiming at integration. The countries have agreed upon deepening cooperation through economic, administrative and military ties. The end of the process is, many believe, Belarus formally joining the Russian Federation. Lukashenka has pledged to maintain the sovereignty of Belarus while also promising to uphold the integration agreements with Russia. The president is in a precarious state, because his country is economically dependent on Russian subsidies. Therefore, every favour from Russia is usually bought with concessions to the integration.
Secondly, partly due to historical link between the two countries, Belarus is often seen as a political laboratory for Russia[3]. Putin has multiple times fashioned his own political actions after carefully examining what Lukashenka has done before him, usually in an attempt to more firmly consolidate his power. Also, events in Russia tend to mirror what has happened in Belarus. Should Lukashenka’s oppressive regime come crashing down, Putin would be wise to fear the same fate. Russia’s political opposition is rather weak and divided, but it has proven capable of gathering people for protesting before (most prominently in 2012[4]) and it can do so again if proper circumstances should arise.
What happens next?
Most academics tend to be careful when it comes to predicting the future, and for a good reason. Right now, it is easy to discern the main factors behind the current political upheaval, i.e. worsening economy and incompetence in managing the epidemic, but before the election took place most observers did not anticipate the rise of Belarusian opposition. It is, however, possible to make some broad estimations about political developments in the coming months.
Many people fear a military intervention by Russia. While it remains a possibility, it is important to remember that Belarus is not the Ukraine in 2014, where the revolution was markedly pro-EU. In fact, the Belarusian opposition has emphasised neutrality regarding EU and NATO to not antagonize Russia[5]. It is obvious, that Putin will do everything in his power to keep Belarus under Russian influence, but as long as there isn’t a risk of pro-West regime taking power, he doesn’t need to go to war for it. Also, it is noteworthy that Russia is already taking part in two conflicts next to its borders, in Ukraine and Georgia, both of which have led to economic sanctions from European countries. Therefore, starting a third one could prove too costly an ordeal.
The most important question; will Belarusian political opposition succeed in toppling the government or at least gain some form of concession, is much harder to augur. As long as Lukashenka firmly controls the army and security forces, any change seems unlikely. EU’s support for Belarusian’s civil society has so far driven Lukashenka to Putin, whose support will most likely be the regime’s lifeline. Lukashenka is not, however, an ideal choice of partner for Putin. In the past Lukashenka has proven to be capricious and unreliable, playing both Russia and EU for maximum profit. It is likely, that at some point Putin will seek to dispose him and elect a new, more cooperative leader for Belarus. As of now, however, Lukashenka is in a vulnerable position and willing to trade his country’s independency in exchange for political and economic support. However, should the protesting persist against all odds, or the political situation in Russia take an unexpected turn, there could be hope for a truly democratic change of power in Belarus.
Sources: Carnegie, CSIS, ECFR, Viasna